Race and Class: More than a Liberal Paradox

Liberal legal theory contains paradoxes in how race and class are conceptualized, particularly in civil rights doctrine and antidiscrimination law. Grahn-Farley argues that understanding race-class dynamics requires moving beyond traditional liberal frameworks that treat race and class as separable categories. Liberal legal theory prioritizes formal equality while struggling to address structural inequalities rooted in intersecting racial and economic hierarchies. The article examines how civil rights law has historically separated racial discrimination from economic subordination, failing to address how race and class mutually reinforce disadvantage. Antidiscrimination doctrine focuses on individual actors' intentional discrimination rather than systemic patterns perpetuating racial and economic inequality. Grahn-Farley contends that liberal paradoxes emerge from this framework's inability to address how capitalism and racial hierarchy have been mutually constituted in American history. By examining race and class together rather than separately, legal scholars can better understand structural discrimination transcending formal legal categories. The article positions intersection of race and class as central to understanding American legal doctrine's limitations and possibilities for reform.

Topics: Civil Rights · Constitutional Law · Legal Theory

Keywords: race · class · antidiscrimination law · civil rights · structural inequality · formal equality · systemic discrimination