Why Modern Evidence Law Lacks Credibility

Modern evidence law relies on fundamental assumptions about witness credibility that lack grounding in contemporary psychological research or rigorous theoretical analysis. Blinka argues that evidence law delegates credibility determination largely to lay jury "common sense" rather than providing independent standards based on reliable methodology. The law posits four core testimonial assumptions: a witness perceives events accurately, recalls memories precisely, testifies truthfully, and sincerely recounts those memories. Yet evidence law supplies no meaningful measure for evaluating credibility beyond popular beliefs, which frequently contradict modern psychology. The article traces how impeachment law developed ad hoc in response to perceived trial abuses rather than coherent theory. Blinka examines the tension between legal rules and policy, modern psychology, and common sense reasoning, showing that evidence law's epistemological foundations rest on outdated everyday beliefs. Through analyzing the common law modes of impeachment—bias, defects in testimonial capacity, truthful character, prior statements, and contradiction—the author demonstrates courts lack rigorous frameworks for assessing witness reliability. Blinka proposes a revised approach that explicitly integrates psychological insights into credibility assessment while maintaining realistic expectations for how lay juries evaluate evidence.

Topics: Evidence & Procedure · Legal Theory · Constitutional Law

Keywords: witness credibility · testimonial assumptions · impeachment · Federal Rules of Evidence · common sense · credibility assessment · lay jury