No State Actor Left Behind: Rethinking Section 1983 Liability in the Context of Disciplinary Alternative Schools and Beyond

Publicly-funded privately-run disciplinary alternative schools exemplify constitutional concerns arising from privatization of government institutions serving vulnerable populations. These schools, which receive public funding yet operate under private contracts, present a classic state action problem under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Atlanta's use of a for-profit company to operate a disciplinary alternative school illustrates how privatization intersects with school-to-prison pipeline dynamics that funnel poor children of color into the criminal justice system. Students at these schools experienced constitutional violations including inadequate due process, unreasonable searches, and physical assaults by staff in a chaotic, violent environment. Parents and reformers seeking remedies face obstacles because relief under Section 1983 requires proving action by state actors, yet government entities maintain that private companies bear responsibility while private companies argue they are not state actors. Obtaining injunctive relief—the only mechanism for prospective change addressing underlying unconstitutional conditions—proves nearly impossible under state action doctrine. Chiang examines the state action doctrine's application to disciplinary alternative schools, explores its constitutional vulnerabilities, and proposes a new doctrine for identifying state action that characterizes similar institutions. The article demonstrates how privatization of institutions serving state-compelled populations creates serious accountability gaps and constitutional rights violations.

Topics: Civil Rights · Constitutional Law · Criminal Procedure

Keywords: state action · privatization · Section 1983 · alternative schools · constitutional rights · discipline · school-to-prison pipeline