Steilen — Volume 61, Issue 2

Presidential independence in constitutional interpretation generates ongoing controversy, particularly regarding separation of powers and the scope of judicial review. The central tension involves competing visions of government: judicial supremacy holds that courts possess ultimate authority to interpret constitutional meaning, while departmentalism posits that each branch possesses independent authority to interpret the Constitution. Steilen argues that judicial supremacy is unnecessary for presidential control and may be counterproductive. Instead, he proposes "collaborative departmentalism"—a doctrine recognizing that mutual consultation and collaboration follow logically from departmental autonomy rather than creating departmental conflict. The principle of departmental autonomy does not necessarily spell conflict between branches but permits and encourages cooperation. Departmentalism has historical roots; major figures including Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt asserted independence from judicial pronouncements on constitutional matters. Defenders of departmentalism divide into three camps: presidentialists emphasizing executive leadership transformation necessary for effective government; populists arguing departmentalism preserves the people's ultimate constitutional exposition; and critics of judicial supremacy opposing unilateral judicial determination of constitutional meaning. Steilen advocates for collaborative departmentalism that emphasizes constitutional politics—the significance of non-judicial action for constitutional meaning—while limiting judicial courts' role. This framework permits constitutional interpretation to be a shared endeavor among branches without reducing judicial authority in inappropriate instances.

Topics: Constitutional Law · Federalism · Legal Theory

Keywords: judicial supremacy · departmentalism · presidential power · separation of powers · constitutional interpretation · judicial review