Dean — Volume 61, Issue 5

Appeal waivers—provisions in plea agreements that extinguish a defendant's right to appeal sentences or convict ions—have proliferated in federal criminal practice despite limited scrutiny of their constitutional validity. Dean examines the emergence of appellate waiver doctrine following the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which shifted from judicial discretion to determinate sentencing guidelines. The article traces how United States v. Wiggins established that defendants could waive appeal rights, with every federal circuit except the D.C. Circuit subsequently upholding such waivers. Dean challenges the traditional justifications for waivers—that they reduce caseloads and serve defendant interests—through empirical analysis and constitutional theory. He argues that the Supreme Court's approach in United States v. Vanderwerff, which rejected a plea agreement with an appeal waiver, provides a preferable standard requiring deferential review of waivers or outright prohibition of appeal waivers in federal pleas. This framework protects judicial capacity to ensure appellate courts maintain consistency and reasonableness in sentencing decisions.

Topics: Criminal Procedure · Constitutional Law · Evidence & Procedure

Keywords: appeal waivers · plea agreements · Sentencing Reform Act · United States v. Wiggins · appellate review · criminal procedure