Buffalo Law Review Archive

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Conover — Volume 62, Issue 1

62 Buff. L. Rev. (2012)

Contemporary anti-corruption reforms typically focus on preventing officials from engaging in corrupt behavior through intent-based approaches. Conover argues that ancient Athens offers valuable institutional lessons, having designed anti-corruption mechanisms based on democratic values rather than merely optimizing corruption reduction. The article examines Athens' regulation of bribery through private rights of action, allowing citizens to prosecute corrupt officials. This approach differed fundamentally from modern anti-corruption agendas, which emphasize detecting corrupt intent. Conover traces how Athens' anti-bribery reforms successfully shifted the society toward less disruptive corruption over time, though measuring absolute efficacy proves impossible. The author analyzes Athens' private right of action for bribery suits as an institutional design mechanism that democratized enforcement and promoted democratic participation. Conover argues that ancient Athenian reforms, grounded in deep democratization principles, offer insights for contemporary anti-corruption reform agendas beyond conventional institutional designs focused on preventing discrete corruption acts.

Topics: Administrative Law · Legal History

Keywords: anti-corruption · bribery · ancient Athens · institutional design · democratization · enforcement · corruption reform

Read the full article (PDF) Original filename: Conover.pdf

How to cite

Conover, Article, 62 Buff. L. Rev. (2012).