The Birth of a Legal Economy: Lawyers and the Development of American Commerce
64 Buff. L. Rev. 1059 (2016)
Despite the well-documented role of lawyers in the early American Republic's political development, their instrumental role in building capitalism remains largely undocumented. Simard demonstrates that private lawyers helped lay the foundation for capitalism in the early Republic when both federal and state governments lacked sufficient power to regulate commerce. American lawyers were more numerous than their counterparts in any other country, driven by economic necessity. Using legal account books and correspondence from frontier lawyers and elite New York City practitioners, Simard reveals the day-to-day work integral to economic growth: lawyers created early monetary policy through promissory note enforcement, expanded eastern markets via property rights enforcement, established legal institutions and markets on the frontier, enriched clients through volatile market trust-building, and provided long-distance debt collection services linking northern and southern economies. The article challenges the unjustified emphasis on lawyers' courtroom work by examining the concrete mechanisms through which the legal profession drove commerce. Simard argues that nineteenth-century lawyers accomplished far more than standard accounts acknowledge: they supplied basic structures required for capitalism to function, not merely managing transactions. Understanding lawyers' role helps explain continuous American economic dominance and contributes to theories of why some countries achieve sustained economic growth that others do not.
Topics: Legal History · Corporate Law
Keywords: American capitalism · legal profession · economic development · frontier law · promissory notes · commercial transactions · legal institutions
How to cite
Justin Simard, The Birth of a Legal Economy: Lawyers and the Development of American Commerce, 64 Buff. L. Rev. 1059 (2016).